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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ZOLA M. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7411 
ELMER W. SMITH, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a decree entered September 14, 
1949, by Honorable Roald A. Hogenson of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, adjudging the 
defendant in contempt of court and sentencing him to 30 days 
in the Salt Lake County jail (R. 133). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
· Zola M. Smith, the plaintiff, was divorced from the de-
fendant by a decree entered in 1941, in which decree the 
defendant was ordered to pay the sum of $50.00 per month 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"as alimony and for support" of the four minor children of 
the parties (R. 12). Plaintiff remarried in 1943 and left the 
State of Utah with the four children, eventually establishing 
her residence in San Bernardino, California. During the years 
between 1941 and the date of the contempt proceedings in 
1949, plaintiff attempted to realize upon the provisions of the 
decree as to alimony and support money, and the record shows 
a number of Orders to Show Cause, Garnishments and Com-
mitments, most of which are not material to the consideration 
of this appeal. 
On February 3, 1949, plaintiff, through her counsel in 
Salt Lake City, filed an order for the defendant to show cause 
why he should not be punished for contempt (R. 99), hearing 
being set for February 9th. Plaintiff appeared by her counsel 
and defendant appeared in person and by counsel. During 
this hearing the parties entered into a stipulation that if 
the defendant and a third person would give a bill of sale 
to the fixtures and equipment in a certain restaurant, transfer 
the lease, and warrant and defend the title to the fixtures 
and equipment, plaintiff would give to defendant a satis-
faction of judgment. On this same day the following order 
was entered by Hon. Clarence E. Baker: 
"The plaintiff's order to show cause comes now on 
for hearing before the Court, the plaintiff appearing 
by and through her counsel, LaMar Duncan, the de-
fendant being present and being represented by his 
counsel, E. LeRoy Shields and Jed Shields. Whereupon 
Elmer W. Smith is sworn and testifies in his own behalf. 
Comes now the defendant and Lilly Parry Smith, a 
third party, and executes and delivers to the plaintiff 
a bill of sale for the fixtures and equipment and the 
4 
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lease at 421 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in full satisfaction of the judgment for alimony and 
support money in favor of the plaintiff, and against 
the defendant. Comes now the plaintiff and moves the 
Court to dismiss the plaintiff's order to show cause and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises, orders 
the plaintiff's order to show cause dismissed." (R.102) 
(Italics added.) 
Immediately thereafter, defendant paid-off his attorneys, 
withdrew some funds he had in an assumed name in a local 
bank, and left the State of Utah. 
On February 19th, LaMar S. Duncan, attorney for plain-
tiff, served upon defendant's counsel a notice of intention to 
move to have the stipulation and order set aside (R. 106). 
Mr. Duncan appeared before Hon. Joseph G. Jeppson on 
February 25th, and moved that the hearing on this motion 
be continued until March 1st; in response to this second 
motion, the court ordered: 
"Upon motion of counsel for the plaintiff and good 
cause appearing therefor, it is hereby ordered plain-
tiff's motion to set aside be, and the same is continued 
to March 1, 1949 at ten o'clock A.M. on the condition 
that plaintiff serves notice upon the defendant not later 
than February 26, 1949." (Italics added.) 
In the meantime (February 24th) Shields and Shields 
had served upon plaintiff's counsel a notice (R. 109) that 
they had withdrawn as attorneys for defendant. Notwith-
standing this notice, plaintiff's counsel served upon Shields 
and Shields a notice that the continued hearing would be 
held on March 1. This notice was served on February 25th, 
the day after notice of withdrawal had been served upon Mr. 
Duncan (R. 110). 
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The motion to set aside was heard ex parte and Hon. 
Clarence E. Baker granted an order as requested (R. 112). 
A decree setting aside the stipulation a-nd reinstating the 
judgment "except as actually satisfied" was signe~ by Judge 
Baker on March 7th. 
During this time the defendant had been in the State 
of Nevada and did not know of the proceedings. He returned 
to Utah in August (T. 156) and on September 9th was served 
with an order to show cause why he should not be committed 
for contempt of court for failure to pay alimony and support 
money (R. 124, 125). On defendant's failure to appear, a 
bench warrant was issued and defendant brought into court 
on September 12 (R. 126). Hearing on the order to show 
cause was held on September 13, defendant appearing in 
person and by counsel, and plaintiff appearing by counsel 
(R. 128). 
The hearing was held before the Hon. Roald A. Hogenson, 
the defendant being the only witness sworn. He, on direct 
examination by plaintiff's counsel, testified that he had with-
drawn approximately $1700 from the Walker Bank & Trust 
Company shortly after the Stipulatoin and Order of Febru-
ary 9th (R. 151). Then the following exchange took place: 
"Q. Would it be February of 1949? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was a few days after you were in court? 
MR. SHIELDS: May I make this observation, and 
make· this objection: when we were in Court that day, 
Mr. Duncan, a settlement was made of this matter 
completely, for all back and future support money and 
alimony. 
6 
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THE COURT: For future alimony? 
MR. DUNCAN: It wasn't future. 
THE COURT: I wouldn't pay any attention to 
future alimony. 
MR. SHIELDS: Everything was settled up that 
day in court, and a stipulation signed by the parties. 
THE COURT: The parties didn't agree to settle 
the support money, not the future support money for 
minor children." ( T. 151) . 
It appeared that the defendant had used the money so 
withdrawn to live on, and to pay off some checks which were 
outstanding (T. 153-155), and that during the time he was 
in Nevada he earned only $50.00 (T. 149). 
There was no testimony by or for the plaintiff, all of 
her evidence coming from the affidavit in support of the order 
to show cause (R. 119). There was nothing in the affidavit 
to show that after March 1, 1949, the defendant had any 
money, or that he had received a notice of the order to pay 
alimony, or that any demand had been made upon him for 
alimony and support money payments. 
Following the conclusion of defendant's testimony, the 
court made the following statement: 
"I don't believe the testimony. He said he has only 
made $50.00 since February, 1949. I simply don't 
believe it. I believe he has made more, and sub-
stantially more. In any event, he had in his possession 
on the 16th day of February, 1949, $1700.00 out of 
which he paid $208.43 for existing obligations which, 
of course, he had to pay. The balance of approximately 
$1500.0Q-a few dollars less than $1500.00, he testi-
fied he used to live on. He testified he has paid nothing 
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,. 
on the decree of this court, in pursuance of the decree 
of this Court since that time for the support of the 
minor children, as ordered in the case. * * *" 
(T. 170). 
The next paragraph of the court's statement (T. 170) 
shows that the court looked at the entire record to fix the 
sentence for contempt, and that the court fixed the penalty 
at the maximum allowed by law. 
On September 14, 1949, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were filed (R. 131, 132), which will be reprinted 
hereinafter. Additional facts will appear in the argument. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The court erred in refusing to hear any evidence as 
to the effect of the Order of February 9, 1949, on future alimony 
and support money payments. 
2. The court erred in finding that the defendant will-
fully refused to pay the money ordered by the court. 
3. From the findings of fact made, the court erred in 
concluding that the defendant was in contempt of court. 
4. The court erred in looking at the entire record to 
determine the amount of punishment to impose upon the 
defendant. 
POINTS 
1. The order of February 9, 1949, should be construed 
to satisfy the judgment of plaintiff for all alimony and sup-
port money, due or to become due, from the defendant. 
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2. An order made after notice and hearing may not be 
set aside ex parte, and an attempt by the court so to do is void, 
of no effect, and subject to attack at any time. 
3. Notice to a withdrawn attorney of record is not notice 
to that attorney's former client. 
4. Where an order, or combination of orders, is so am-
biguous that it cannot reasonably be determined therefrom 
what is required to be done, such order, or combination, should 
not be the foundation of a contempt proceeding. 
5. Where a new order is entered, directing a party to do 
something he was not theretofore bound to do, or clarifying an 
order that was theretofore ambiguous, the party against whom 
the order is directed is entitled to notice of the new order 
before he can be found in contempt of court for failure to 
obey it. 
6. Notice or knowledge by the defendant of what is 
required of him must appear either in the proofs taken at the 
hearing or in the affidavit supporting the citation and order 
to show cause. 
7. In order to support the conclusion that the defendant 
is in contempt of court, the court must find that the defendant 
knew of the order to pay money, that he refused, and that he 
had ability to pay during the period of time in which he pos-
sessed the knowledge of his duty. 
8. Civil contempt proceedings are for the purpose of 
enforcing an order of the court, not for imposing a penalty for 
past disobedience. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR ANY 
EVIDENCE AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE ORDER OF 
FEBRUARY 9, 1949, ON FUTURE ALIMONY AND SUP-
PORT MONEY. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANT WILLFULLY REFUSED TO PAY THE MON-
EY ORDERED BY THE COURT. 
1. The order of February 9, 1949, should be construed 
to satisfy the judgment of plaintiff for all alimony and support 
money, due or to become due, from the defendant. 
As appears in the Statement of Facts, the order entered 
by Hon. Clarence E. Baker on February 9th incorporated the 
stipulation that in consideration of the transfer of certain 
restaurant property to the plaintiff there was a "full satisfac-
tion of the judgment for alimony and support money in favor 
of the plaintiff, and against the defendant" (R. 102). 
When the parties entered into this stipulation, it was the 
agreement that the entire claim of the plaintiff would be satis-
fied and that the proceedings would be terminated. The stipu-
lation was the result of an attempt by the parties to close 
the long file involved in the case. And although the stipulation 
does not appear in the record, its intent and meaning is re-
10 
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fleeted in the proceedings and in the order of the court entered 
on the basis of the stipulation. 
There was a judgment and decree for alimony and sup-
port money entered against the defendant in 1941. In 1948 
the past-due portion had reduced to a new judgment. Defend-
ant came in on February 9, 1949, on an order to show cause 
why he should not be committed for contempt for failure to 
pay alimony and support money to the plaintiff. The order 
subsequently issued by the court, by its terms, satisfies the 
judgment for all alimony and support money. And "judgment" 
is a broad term in the code states. It includes decrees in equity 
and divorce proceedings as well as judgments at law. As is 
said in 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, §4: 
"In the states which have adopted the Code procedure, 
however, * * * relief in all actions, whether of 
a legal or equitable character, is obtained by a judg-
ment in a civil action of the code." 
And see Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §464 (a) to the same 
effect. Also, 23 Words and Phrases 166, et seq. The code 
definition of "judgment" is a very real factor to consider in 
arriving at the intent of the parties in making the stipulation, 
and the intent of the court in incorporating it into its order. 
To hold that this stipulation and order satisfied only that 
portion of the judgment that was past due, or "reduced to 
judgment'' is to disregard its plain words. 
It should also be noted that counsel for plaintiff was quick 
to procure the court to set aside this order and stipulation and 
order before taking steps to have the defendant placed in 
contempt of court. 
11 
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2. An order made after notice and hearing may not be 
set aside ex parte, and an attempt by the court so to do is void, 
of no effect, and subject to attack at any time. 
While it is true that a stipulation may be, in the proper 
case, set aside by the court ex parte and without notice, and 
that the same may be done with certain orders of the court, there 
are types of orders which may be set aside only after notice to 
the adverse party. This statement of principle was recog-
nized and asserted by this Court in Cox v. Dixie Power Com-
pany, 81 Utah 94, 16 P. 2d 916, at 921: 
"Where a court has jurisdiction of a cause and of the 
parties, there are undoubtedly various orders which the 
court can make without notice to the adverse party and 
be of binding effect, in the absence of a motion or 
notice to vacate or modify the order. But such doctrine 
applies only to such orders as the court has power 
to make without notice. It does not apply to a pur-
ported ex parte order whose effect is to deprive a party 
of property without due process of law or which con-
stitutes a final order affecting substantial rights from 
which an appeal lies. * * * A motion is ordin-
arily confined to incidental matters in the progress of 
the case." (Italics added.) 
In the present case the Order of March 1st, setting aside 
the stipulation and order of February 9th, was such an order 
as would require notice under the language of the quoted 
opinion. By setting aside the order and stipulation, the Court 
deprived the defendant of valuable property ( and eventually 
liberty) without notice. This appears more conclusive when it 
is observed that the March 1st order set aside the stipulation, 
yet allowed the plaintiff to retain the property she had acquired 
12 
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by virtue of the stipulation-from the defendant and a third 
party against whom the original decree did not run. If the 
court was to set aside the stipulation, it was imperative that 
it set the entire transaction aside. It was unjust and error to 
allow the plaintiff to retain the benefits of the stipulation while 
suffering no detriment in return. 
Two sections of the Utah statutes require notice of motions 
and orders. Section 104-42-6 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads: 
"An order made out of court without notice to the ad-
verse party may be vacated and modified without notice 
by the judge who made it, or may be vacated and modi-
fied on notice.'' 
This section is precise as to what may be done without notice. 
Negative implication requires the construction that in other 
cases notice must be given. 
Together with the above, we must read 104-14-4, which 
governs, generally, the setting aside of orders: 
" * * * The Court may likewise, in its discretion, 
after notice to the adverse party, allow upon such terms 
as may be just an amendment to any pleading or pro-
ceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms 
allow an answer, reply or motion for new trial to be 
made and filed after the time limited by this code; and 
may also, upon such terms as be just, relieve a party or 
his legal representatives from a judgment, order or 
other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, 
inadvertance, surprise or excpsable neglect." 
This provision requires notice as a prerequisite to setting 
aside an order which was entered with notice and hearing. 
Such a construction is a logical one. It has been followed by 
13 
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the California Court of Appeal. California Code of . Civil 
Procedure § 473 is substantially the same as our 104-14-4. 
This section 473 came before the California court in Moran v. 
Superior Court in and for Sacramento County, 35 Cal. App. 2d 
629, 96 P. 2d 193. 
The Moran case was one in which the defendant after 
notice and hearing had procured the court to make an order 
setting aside an interlocutory decree of divorce. The trial court 
later decided that it had erred in setting aside the decree and 
on its own motion and without notice set the prior order aside 
and reinstated the decree. The Court of Appeal agreed that 
the trial court had erred in setting aside the decree in the 
first instance; but it went on to hold that the second order-
reinstating the decree-was void because it had been made 
without notice to the defendant. Said the court: 
"In determining the question as to whether an order 
of this character is valid or void, the same test should 
be applied . as where a judgment is subjected to the 
inquiry. 42 C.J. 5·57, § 272. * * * 
The order made pursuant to the notice of motion was 
therefore not void on its face, and the trial court ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction in vacating such order on its 
own motion." (Italics added.) 
The general rule, as laid down in 60 C.J.S., Motions and 
Orders, § 62 ( 5), p. 75-, is as follows: 
"A party who may be interested in resisting the motion 
may be entitled to notice of motion to amend, modify, 
or vacate an order, and especially so when the order 
sought to be amended, modified, or vacated is an order 
that was itself settled, made and entered on notice." 
14 
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If the order setting aside the stipulation and order of 
February 9th was void, defendant could properly disregard it 
and attack the validity of the second order at any time. As the 
California Supreme Court said in Smith v. Los Angeles and 
P.R. Co., 34 Pac. 242, 4 Cal. Unrep. Cs. 237: 
"This is not a direct attack upon the order appointing 
the receiver, but the order being void, it may be dis-
regarded. If the order is absolutely void, it is a nullity, 
and can be attacked in any proceeding." 
On the final hearing of the order to show cause, which 
led directly to the sentencing of defendant for contempt, and 
hence to this appeal, counsel for defendant objected to interro-
gation of the defendant as to his earnings on the ground that 
the judgment of the plaintiff had been satisfied and that there 
was nothing before the court. If satisfaction were established, 
there would be nothing of which defendant could be in con-
tempt. But the trial court refused to consider the question of 
satisfaction and proceeded with the hearing. To preserve the 
record, defendant was not obligated to make an offer of proof 
on the point for two reasons: ( 1) the burden was on the 
plaintiff to establish that there was a subsisting order of which 
the defendant was in contempt, and (2) the court's point-
blank refusal to hear anything concerning the effect of the 
stipulation on future alimony and support money would have 
obviated .the necessity of an offer of proof, even if the satis-
faction had been an element of defense-for defendant would 
not have been obligated to make a futile offer merely for the 
sake of form when the court had indicated what its ruling 
would be. Hereinafter we will point out how this refusal of 
the court to inquire into the terms of the satisfaction was 
15 
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prejudicial error even if the stipulation and order was not sub-
sisting. 
3. Notice to a withdrawn attorney of record is not notice 
to that attorney's former client. 
We have attempted to point out the law as to require-
ments of notice of motions and orders. If it be argued tha't 
there was notice to the defendant, through his counsel, it need 
only be shown that the defendant's counsel had been released 
by the defendant prior to the service of the notice, and were 
no longer authorized to act for him nor to appear for him. 
Shields and Shields had been released as counsel for the 
defendant on February 9th, or a few days thereafter. On 
February 19th, plaintiff's attorney, LaMar S. Duncan, served 
on them a notice that he would move, on February 25th, to 
have the order and stipulation set aside. Later plaintiff obtained 
a continuance to March 1st, the order granting the continuance 
being "on condition" that the defendant be notified not later 
than February 26th. -
Prior to plaintiff's service of a notice of continuance, 
Shields and Shields served upon plaintiff's counsel, and filed 
with the court, a notice that they had withdrawn, and that they 
no longer represented the defendant. The day after receiving 
this notice of withdrawal, viz., on February 25th, plaintiff's 
counsel served upon Shields and Shields_ a notice of the con-
tinued hearing. _ 
The notice thus served complied neither with the general 
law as to notices of motion, nor to the express order of the 
court below. The cmut, in acting on the motion to set aside 
16 
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the stipulation and order, was obligated to ascertain whether 
proper notice had been given. And the record before it showed 
that it had not. 
Whether service on a discharged attorney is service on a 
party has been decided by this Court. In Sandall v. Sandall, 
57 Utah 150, 193 Pac. 1093, 15 A.L.R. 620, the plaintiff sought 
to modify a decree nine years after it had been entered. Notice 
of motion to modify was served on the attroneys who were then 
attorneys of record, having represented the defendant in the 
original action. Apparently no withdrawal as attorney was ever 
entered. But the court held that the service of the notice was 
not sufficient to bind the defendant, and said: 
"The authorities support the proposition that an at-
torney's relation to his client ceases upon the rendition 
of judgment and satisfaction thereof, unless there are 
disturbing events or a special arrangement continuing 
the relation. The following excerpt from 6 C. J., p. 
672, Sec. 184, illustrates the trend of authority: 
'In the absence of disturbing events the employment of 
an attorney continues as long as the suit or business 
upon which he is engaged is pending, and ordinarily 
comes to an end with the completion of the special 
task for which the attorney was employed. Where the 
evidence of continuance of the relation is conflicting, 
it is a question for the jury. 
'It is always a presumption that an attorney is employed 
to conduct the litigation to judgment, and no farther; 
the relation of attorney and client and the general 
powers of attorney cease upon the rendition and enter-
ing of the judgment. There is a distinction between 
those cases where the attorney is retained to represent 
the plaintiff, and those in which he represents the de-
fendant; in the latter case, the entry of final judgment 
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always terminates the relation and the attorney's author-
ity; in the former case it is generally the rule that the 
attorney's authority lasts until satisfaction of the judg-
ment, and that he may take the ordinary and usual 
steps to secure such satisfaction.' " 
In the present case, in addition to the circumstance that 
the litigation for which the attorneys for defendant were em-
ployed had ended, there was the factor that notice of this fact 
had been given to plaintiff, and that the withdrawal of attor-
neys was made a matter of record. This being so, plaintiff's 
counsel could not give notice to the withdrawn attorneys and 
have it suffice to constitute notice to the defendant. 
From the foregoing arguments it appears that there was 
no notice of motion given to the defendant, and that the court 
exceeded its jurisdiction in going ahead ex parte in deciding 
a matter of such consequence. And inasmuch as the stipulation 
and order invalidly set aside settled all judgments in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant, there was nothing 
before the court for which the defendant could be committed 
for contempt. 
4. Where an order, or combination of orders, is so am-
biguous that it cannot be reasonably determined therefrom 
what is required to be done, such order, or combination, should 
not be the foundation of a contempt proceeding. 
Assuming, but not conceding, that the order and stipu-
lation of February 9th can be construed to satisfy the judg-
ment only as to past due alimony and support money, it must 
at least be held that the stipulation is capable of the construc-
tion we have given it. The language is broad enough to be 
ambiguous. 
18 
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In McCaleb v. McCaleb, 177 Cal. 147, 169 Pac. 1023, the 
Supreme Court of California said: 
"One who is ordered to pay money to another, on pain 
of imprisonment if he fails, is entitled to a formal ex-
pression by the court of such order, stated clearly 
enough to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to 
know what he is to do. He should not be obliged to 
resort to inferences or implication to ascertain a duty 
or obligation of that character." 
The Supreme Court of Kansas added its views on the 
subject in Ensch v. Ensch, 157 Kan. 107, 138 P. 2d 491. That 
court, in- ruling on a contempt commitment on an ambiguous 
order, first quoted 17 C. J. S., Contempt, § 12, to the following 
effect: 
"A decree or order will not be expanded by implication 
in contempt proceedings, beyond the meaning of its 
terms when read in the light of the purpose for which 
the suit was brought, and the facts found must consti-
tute a plain violation of the decree or order so read. 
To justify adjudging one guilty of contempt for the 
alleged violation of an order, the order must be so 
clearly expressed that when applied to the act com-
plained of, it will appear with reasonable certainty 
that it has been violated. * * * Nor should a party 
be punished for disobedience of an order which is 
capable of a construction consistent with his innocence", 
and then went on to set aside the judgment of contempt on 
the ground that the original order was ambiguous. 
In the instant case, the original decree entered in 1941 
was clear enough, and we do not question that defendant 
knew what was required of him thereunder. But a new order, 
or stipulation (the term is not important) was entered in 1949; 
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and at this time it became necessary to read the decree and the 
subsequent order as one. In so reading them there was, at the 
very least, some doubt as to what was required of the defend-
ant. He did not-and could not-know for certain whether 
he was still under an obligation to pay money to the plaintiff, 
nor whether-if so obligated-plaintiff intended to enforce 
the decree after the action of February 9th. 
5. Where a new order is entered, directing defendant to 
do something he was not theretofore bound to do, or clarify-
ing an order that was theretofore ambiguous, the party against 
whom the order is directed is entitled to notice of the new 
order before he can be found in contempt of court for failure 
to obey it. 
Consider the situation of the defendant on February 9, 
1949. On that day the court entered an order, and the parties 
had entered into a stipulation, that the judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff was satisfied. At that moment, either ( 1) the 
judgment was fully satisfied, both as to past due and future 
payments, or (2) it was saitsfied as to past due payments and 
there was some doubt as to satisfaction of future payments. If 
there had been no order setting aside the stipulation and order, 
defendant could not have been found in contempt at that point. 
What was the effect of the order of March 7th? Either 
it reinstated the decree calling for alimony and support money 
payments, or it clarified the situation of February 9th, i.e., it 
modified the decree and order to such an extent that defendant 
would thereafter know that he was required to make monthly 
payments to the plaintiff. 
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But whichever was the case, something more had. to be 
done before defendant could be found in contempt. It was 
a condition precedent to contempt that defendant have notice 
or knowledge of his duty. There is not even a pretense that 
defendant knew of the order of March 7th, or that any notice 
of it was served on him or his former counsel. Even if we 
ascribe to him notice that the hearing was to be held, he was 
still entitled to notice of the action taken at the hearing-or 
after it-if he was not present when the order was made, or 
if he had no actual knowledge of it. He had neither notice 
nor knowledge. 
It is well established that a party is entitled to notice of 
the entry of an original decree. See 17 C. ]. S., Contempt, 
§ 18, and cases cited therein. Also, Phillips v. Superior Court 
of Kern County (California), 137 P. 2d 838. The doctrine 
has also been enunciated by this Court-in In re Hoover, 44 
Utah 476, 141 Pac. 101: 
"It must appear that such order, judgment or decree 
has been personally served on the one charged, or that 
he had notice of the making of such order, or the ren-
dition of such judgment or decree." 
There is no difference in principle between an original 
decree and a modified or reinstated decree. And this principle 
concerns itself with substance rather than form. Whether the 
original decree was modified by an order, a supplemental de-
cree, a stipulation, or whatever else; when it is reinstated the 
party against whom it is directed must have notice of the 
reinstatement or modification-particularly when the decree 
as modified requires the party to do something he was not 
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theretofore bound to do. The question is this: Did the de-
fendant know what was required of him? 
6. Notice or knowledge by the defendant of what is re-
quired of him must appear either in the proofs taken at the 
hearing or in the affidavit supporting the order to show cause. 
As was pointed out in Point 5 of this Argument, notice 
or knowledge on the part of the defendant must be shown 
as a condition precedent to commitment for contempt. And 
this notice or knowledge must appear by some form of evidence: 
either in the affidavit, or in the testimony and proofs taken 
at the contempt hearing. 
The Oregon Supreme Court followed this principle in 
Hewson v. Hewson, 129 Ore. 612, 277 Pac. 1012, 63 A.L.R. 
1216, as follows: 
"And the affidavit charging the contempt must aver 
that the order has thus been served and the demand 
made. See to the same effect Trullinger v. Howe, 58 
Or. 73, 113 Pac. 4. In the recent case of State ex rei. 
Hambrecht v. Hambrecht, 128 Ore. 305, 274 Pac. 507, 
the contemnor's knowledge of the duty was not posi-
tively averred, but it was inferred from those recitals 
of the affidavit to the effect that he had at one time 
complied with the duty. In our present case neither the 
so-called affidavit, nor the petition, affords any basis 
for such an inference." 
Plaintiff's affidavit in this case reads as follows: 
"ZOLA SMITH FISHER, formerly ZOLA SMITH, 
having been first duly sworn, deposes and says: that on 
the 14th day of February, A. D. 1941, this Court made 
and entered a decree of divorce, which among other 
things granted to her custody of the four minor chil-
22 
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dren of said parties, and awarded to her and ordered 
the defendant to pay to her the sum of Fifty ( $50.00) 
Dollars each month for the support and maintenance 
of said minor children; that since the entry of said 
decree defendant has paid to plaintiff nothing except 
those sums received involuntarily from defendant and 
by the proceedings of this court as indicated by the 
files herein; that be has paid nothing since the court 
proceedings in February, 1949. 
Affiant further states that recently defendant has come 
into an inheritance of a considerable amount of money 
from his father's estate and he nevertheless has refused 
and still refuses to pay anything at all to the support 
of said minor children; that defendant is now working, 
able bodied and capable of paying this award. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that this Court issue 
citation ordering defendant to be and appear before this 
court * * * " . (R. 119) (Italics added.) 
In the above affidavit there is no averment that defendant 
received any notice of the change in the court's order entered 
after the hearing of March. Nor is there any room for inference 
that defendant knew of the new order. The affidavit does state 
that defendant made some payments under the original decree 
-a statement which might be proper basis for an inference 
under the Hambrecht case, cited in the opinion, supra-but the 
efficacy of this statement as basis for inference is dispelled 
when we read the entire affidavit. For the court's attention 
was directed to "the files of the case" and to the "Court pro-
ceedings in February, 1949." The files of the case, including 
the proceedings of the court on February 9th, were then before 
it and the court erred if it raised an inference of notice from 
reading the entire affidavit. And if it did not raise such an 
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inference, there is nothing in the record on which the court 
could find that the defendant had notice. See 23 C. ]., Evi-
dence, § 1919, to the effect that the court will judicially notice 
the original record in ancillary proceedings, such as proceedings 
in contempt. And see 24 L.R.A. ( N .S.) 404. 
Thus we observe there was no evidence to support a 
finding that the defendant willfully refused to pay money 
to the plaintiff, because there is no evidence to show that he 
had knowledge of a duty to so pay: ( 1) no averment of notice, 
and ( 2) no facts from which- an inference of notice can be 
drawn. Nothing brought out at the hearing showed notice 
or knowledge-either directly or by implication. 
III 
FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE, THE 
COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT WAS IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
7. In order to support the conclusion that the defendant 
is in contempt of court, the court must find that the defendant 
knew of the order to pay money, that he refused, and that he 
had ability to pay during the period of time in which he 
possessed the knowledge of his duty. 
After the hearing in the contempt proceeding the trial 
court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of 
law: 
"That heretofore this Court made and entered its de-
cree of divorce awarding to plaintiff the custody of said 
minor children and ordering defendant to pay to plain-
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tiff for the support of said minor children the sum of 
Fifty ( $50.00) Dollars each month. 
2. 
That heretofore, to wit, on the day of March, 
A. D. 1949, this Court made and entered its decree 
and judgment for arrears in said payments in the sum 
of $2,635.00. 
3. 
That during said time defendant has been able to pay 
for the support of said children and has received and 
has had at least $1540.46, since the 9th day of Febru-
ary, A. D. 1949. 
4. 
That since said date defendant has willfully failed and 
refused to pay anything to plaintiff for the support of 
said minor children, although ordered to do so by this 
court. 
As conclusions of law from the foregoing facts the 
Court finds: 
CONCLUSIONS. OF LAW 
That defendant is guilty of contempt of . Court and 
for this contempt defendant be ordered to serve a 
period of thirty ( 30) days in the County Jail of Salt 
Lake County. * * * " 
We respectfully urge the Court that a judgment of con-
tempt, based upon such ambiguous, uncertain, and contra-
dictory findings cannot stand-for there is something more 
here than a "minor irregularity." In paragraph 3, the Court 
finds that "during said time" defendant has been able to pay; 
but in the preceding two paragraphs there is no date certain 
which "during said time" refers to. The Court also found 
that defendant had money since the 9th day of February -
which means he had money during at least 21 days in which 
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he had no obligation to pay. For it will be conceded, we 
think, that under no theory was there an obligation' to pay 
prior to the first day_ of Marth .. Paragraph 4 states that "since; 
said date" the defendant has willfully refused and. failed to 
' · .. ' ' . . .. 
pay. But we have no way of knowing what date the .Court is 
referring to. 
The specific must control the ·general - and this is par-
ticularly true as a rule of construction where there is a conflict 
between the two. And although there is here a general finding 
that the defendant willfully. refused to pay alimony and sup-
port money as ordered by the Court, this general finding is 
rendered nugatory by the subsequent findings as to defendant's 
ability to pay. Furthermore, there is no finding at all that 
the defendant had knowledge of the demands of the decree. 
So we find a situation where there ate insufficient facts 
to support the findings made; insufficient findings; and other 
findings which are so uncertain and ambiguous that they fail 
to support the conclusions of law. 
We are aware that there is a line of authority indicating 
that a Citation a:rid Order to Show Cause is sufficient to con-
stitute notice of the demands of the decree, and of the demand 
of the plaintiff that the defendant perform as ordered. But 
a Citation issued in August is notice in August. And if the 
Court relies upon the Citation _as evidence of notice to the 
defendant, there must be evidenc~and a finding-that the 
defendant was able to pay as ordered after the citation was 
issued. There was no such finding::......,.and there was no evidence 
to support such a finding. 
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IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN LOOKING TO THE EN-
TIRE RECORD TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF 
PUNISHMENT TO IMPOSE UPON THE DEFENDANT 
FOR CONTEMPT. 
8. Civil contempt proceedings are for the purpose of en-
forcing an order of the Court, not for the purpose of imposing 
a penalty for past disobedience. 
On page 170 of the transcript of proceedings at the hear-
ing appears the following address by the Court: 
"As to the amount of punishment the Court will inflict 
upon the defendant in the case, the Court now refers 
to the file, and the entire file; the Court finds that there 
has been a great amount of litigation over the failure 
of the defendant to comply with the Decree of the 
Court. The Court finds from the record that Judge 
B. P. Leverich committed the Defendant for wilful 
contempt, failure to comply with the terms of the decree 
on December 1, 1941; and again in January, 1949, 
defendant was committed to the County Jail by Judge 
Baker. * * * " 
Following this there are indications that the trial court 
sought to reinforce its ideas of social policy by making an ex-
ample of the defendant. The court looked at the entire record 
-except those portions of the record which would excuse or 
mitigate the conduct of the defendant. That the court should 
not allow prior contempt proceedings to influence it in fixing 
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punishment in a given contempt case, and that to take judicial 
notice of such prior proceedings is an abuse of discretion and 
reversible error, is P?inted out in 1, 7 C.J.S., Contempt,§ 124( e). 
Civil contempt proceedings have. been· defined well· and 
often as a type of proceeding for enforcing an order. of the 
court-usually for the benefit of a party. The purpose of such 
a proceeding is coercive; not t(!tributive. And the court should 
not allow past contempt proceedings to influence it in fixing 
punishment in a current one--unless such past proceedings 
convince the court that the more severe sentence will affect 
the readiness of the defendant to pay in the case before it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The order of February 9th settled the entire judgment in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and the March 1st 
order setting it aside was void because entered without notice 
to the defendant. This being so, the defendant could not be 
committed for contempt because there was no subsisting order 
to pay money to the plaintiff. 
But even if the stipulation and order was properly set 
aside, that is, was not void, defendant was entitled to notice 
of the action taken by the court. It was necessary that he be 
apprised of his duties before he could willfully refuse to per-
form them. The findings of fact must show that he had such 
notice; and these findings of fact must be supported by evi-
dence. 
And, finally, the court abused its discretion and committed 
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~ reversible error in taking judicial notice of prior contempt pro-
~· ceedings. 
Upon this argument, and for the reasons appearing there-
·~ in, we submit that the judgment of the trial court should be 
~4 reversed and the defendant ordered discharged. 
[~' 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIELDS and SHIELDS, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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